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Abstract 
Managerial trickle-down effects refer to the tendency for supervisors to treat their 
subordinates in ways analogous to how they have been treated by their own bosses. Whereas 
trickle-down effects are widely documented, including in the justice literature, less is known 
about the conditions under which they are more versus less likely to emerge. Across two 
studies we examined how supervisors’ tendencies to exhibit interpersonal fairness are 
interactively determined by the informational fairness they receive from managers above 
them and supervisors’ sense of power. Study 1 was a multi-source survey conducted in 
organizational settings. Study 2 was an experiment in which we manipulated the 
informational fairness that supervisors received from managers and supervisors’ sense of 
power. The results of both studies showed that the positive relationship between the 
informational fairness received from managers and supervisors’ enactment of interpersonal 
fairness was stronger among supervisors who had a lower sense of power. This interactive 
effect did not emerge on supervisors’ enactment of other forms of fairness (distributive, 
procedural and informational), consistent with prior theory and research showing that 
interpersonal fairness allows for greater discretion than other forms of fairness. Theoretical 
and practical implications are discussed as are limitations and suggestions for future research.  
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            Organizational scholars’ recent interest in managers’ enactment of fairness, that is, the 
study of managers’ tendencies to behave more or less fairly towards their direct reports, has 
its roots in the decades of prior empirical work showing that the fairness managers exhibit to 
their direct reports is consequential (Adams, 1965; Bies, 1987; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut 
& Walker, 1975). In their historical review of the organizational justice literature Colquitt, 
Greenberg, and Zapata-Phelan (2005) reported that in many different organizational settings, 
a wide variety of employee beliefs (e.g., organizational commitment) and behaviors (e.g., job 
performance) have systematically been affected by various forms of managerial fairness (i.e., 
distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal). Overwhelmingly, employees 
respond more positively when they have been treated more fairly by their managers.   
            There has been a paradigmatic shift since the Colquitt et al. (2005) review. 
Increasingly, scholars are examining organizational justice as a dependent variable 
(Brockner, Wiesenfeld, Siegel, Bobocel, & Liu, 2015). One particularly fruitful approach has 
investigated when and why managers treat their direct reports more versus less fairly. 
Conceptual papers include those of Molinsky and Margolis (2005), who offered a thoughtful 
analysis of when managers deliver bad news with interpersonal sensitivity, and Scott, 
Colquitt, and Paddock (2009), who provided a comprehensive framework of the motives that 
lead managers to behave more or less fairly; see also Ambrose and Schminke (2009).    
 The growing empirical literature on managers’ fairness towards their direct reports 
has examined an array of factors such as those pertaining to the managers enacting the 
fairness and to the direct reports on the receiving end. For instance, Scott, Garza, Conlon and 
Kim (2014) showed that managers’ motives (“hot versus cold”) were differentially predictive 
of various forms of justice. Brebels, De Cremer, van Dijke, and Van Hiel (2011) found that 
managers with stronger moral identity were more likely to adhere to several principles of 
procedural fairness (accuracy, voice). Other studies examining factors associated with the 
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recipients of the fairness have shown that employees’ trustworthiness influences managers’ 
tendencies to be informationally, interpersonally, and procedurally fair (Zapata, Olsen, & 
Martins, 2013; Zhao, Chen, & Brockner, 2015).  
In addition to the influence on managerial fairness of factors associated with 
managers and their direct reports, encounters between the two parties take place in a broader 
context. One particularly salient contextual factor in organizational life is hierarchy: 
managers responsible for enacting decisions typically have bosses as well. That is, managers 
are at once agents as well as recipients of decisions (Bryant & Stensaker, 2011; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1992; Shi, Markoczy, & Dess, 2009). Thus, another important determinant of 
managerial fairness is how they were treated by their own bosses.  
Support for this assertion comes from theory and research on trickle-down effects, 
which has gained popularity in organizational behavior in general and in the organizational 
justice literature more specifically (e.g., Ambrose, Schminke, & Mayer, 2013; Wo, Ambrose, 
& Schminke, 2015). The essence of a trickle-down effect is that supervisors' perceptions of 
their managers’ actions influence how those same supervisors act toward others at lower 
levels. In line with this approach, research on justice trickle-down effects suggests that the 
fairness with which those in positions of authority are treated by their managers may 
influence the fairness that they exhibit towards their direct reports (Ambrose et al., 2013; 
Folger, Ganegoda, Rice, Taylor, & Wo, 2013; Masterson, 2001; Mawritz, Mayer, Hoobler, 
Wayne, & Marinova, 2012; Tepper & Taylor, 2003; Wayne, Liden, Graf, & Ferris, 1997; Wo 
et al., 2015).      
More recently, however, it has been suggested that supervisors do not always “do 
unto others as has been done unto them” to the same degree (e.g. van Houwelingen, van 
Dijke, & De Cremer, 2017). In the present research, we seek to provide deeper insight into 
the question of when supervisors are more versus less likely to exhibit fairness to their 
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employees as a function of how fairly they were treated by their own bosses. Delineating 
when justice trickle-down effects are more versus less likely is theoretically and practically 
important. For example, at a theoretical level, we can better understand why certain justice 
trickle-down effects occur to the extent we can demonstrate when they are more versus less 
likely to occur. Moreover, at a practical level, given the pervasive effects that managers’ 
fairness can have on employees’ work attitudes and behaviors, organizations have much to 
gain by understanding when managers’ fairness at one level is more versus less likely to 
ripple through the ranks of supervisors at lower levels of the organization. (From this point 
forward, in discussing trickle-down effects we refer to those at higher levels of authority as 
“managers” and those at lower levels as “supervisors.”) 
More specifically, we examine the impact of managers’ informational fairness 
(Colquitt, 2001), that is, how well managers explain their or the organizations’ decisions to 
supervisors below them, on supervisors’ enactment of interpersonal fairness to their own 
direct reports. Given the high degree of uncertainty in many workplace environments 
(Bradley, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2011), a particularly useful type of behavior for sense-
making purposes is managers’ informational fairness, that is, the explanations that managers 
provide about why decisions are made. Managers are well situated to be sources of 
informational fairness in several respects. First, they usually have a broader base of 
knowledge and therefore a better understanding of why decisions are made, relative to 
supervisors further down the hierarchy (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Furthermore, being at higher 
levels gives managers legitimate authority to explain organizational decisions (Katz & Kahn, 
1978; Van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2011).  
Yet another reason to examine the trickle-down effect of managers’ informational 
fairness is that it is a form of fairness of relatively high frequency. Whereas other forms of 
managerial fairness such as distributive fairness and procedural fairness are exhibited 
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primarily when resource allocation decisions are made (Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990), 
informational fairness is enacted not only in resource allocation contexts but also in the 
course of more everyday interactions between managers and their direct reports, such as 
when managers explain the reasons for a new strategic initiative or why changes in policy or 
procedure are being planned or implemented.   
Whereas we expect managers’ informational fairness to be positively related to 
supervisors’ interpersonal fairness, of greater importance we seek to evaluate when such a 
justice trickle-down effect may be more versus less likely to occur. One plausible determinant 
of variability in trickle-down effects is the sense of power felt by supervisors, which has been 
defined as the perception of one’s ability to influence others (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 
2012). We examined how supervisors’ sense of power could influence the magnitude of the 
trickle-down effect, for two reasons. First, supervisors’ sense of power determines how 
receptive they are to external versus internal sources of information as guides for their own 
behavior (Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015). As we explain further below, this assertion 
provides a theoretical basis to predict that the trickle-down effect will be stronger among 
supervisors with a lower sense of power. Second, employees’ sense of power is fundamentally 
related to the hierarchical nature of organizational life, which in turn sets the stage for the study 
of managerial trickle-down effects. Indeed, where employees reside in the hierarchy is one (but 
by no means the only) factor that affects their sense of power.     
Specifying the Nature of the Moderating Effect of Supervisors’ Sense of Power   
Supervisors who have a lower sense of power are more externally focused, and 
therefore are more susceptible to being influenced by environmental cues (Galinsky, Magee, 
Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Accordingly, we would expect that the positive 
relationship between managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ interpersonal fairness 
is more likely to be shown by supervisors with a lower sense of power. In contrast, 
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supervisors with a stronger sense of power are less likely to be influenced by external cues 
and instead may be more likely to act on internal drivers of behavior (Chen, Lee-Chai, & 
Bargh, 2001; DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012), such as their own values, 
attitudes, and preferences.   
The findings of Pitesa and Thau (2013) are consistent with the notion that those with a 
lower sense of power are more influenced by external cues for appropriate behavior. In two 
of their studies participants experiencing varying degrees of power were placed in an ethical 
dilemma in which they were given information about how peers facing the same situation had 
behaved. Those with a lower sense of power were more likely to behave the way their peers 
did, relative to their counterparts who experienced a higher sense of power. Pitesa and Thau 
thus found that in a non-hierarchical setting people’s sense of power dictated their reliance 
on external cues to guide their own behavior. Whereas Pitesa and Thau looked at how cues 
coming from peers affected participants’ tendency to behave ethically, we examine how cues 
coming from parties higher up in the hierarchy affect participants’ tendencies to behave 
fairly. We expect the positive relationship between managers’ informational fairness and 
supervisors’ interpersonal fairness towards their direct reports to be stronger among 
supervisors with a lower sense of power.   
Another noteworthy purpose of the present research is to evaluate whether 
supervisors’ sense of power will moderate the effect of managers’ informational fairness on 
supervisors’ enactment of interpersonal fairness in particular, rather than on supervisors’ 
enactment of other forms of fairness (distributive, procedural, and informational). If this 
prediction is supported, it would serve the theoretically important purpose of delineating a 
way in which interpersonal fairness meaningfully differs from the other forms of fairness. In 
Study 1 supervisors rated the informational fairness that their managers showed to them and 
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were then rated by their direct reports on how much they (the supervisors) exhibited various 
forms of fairness: interpersonal, distributive, procedural, and informational.  
Distinguishing Interpersonal Fairness from Other Forms of Fairness   
As Scott et al. (2009) theorized and as Scott et al. (2014) empirically demonstrated, 
interpersonal fairness allows for greater discretion in how to behave than do the other forms 
of fairness. Discretion refers to the amount of latitude that people have when formulating or 
implementing their actions. In their typical role as implementers of decisions, supervisors 
have relatively little input into the distributive, procedural, and informational fairness of 
decisions reserved more for those at higher levels of management. Interpersonal fairness, 
however, is different. It refers to the way in which supervisors carry out their roles, and in 
particular, the extent to which they treat their subordinates with dignity and respect when 
implementing organizational decisions. Supervisors may have relatively little influence over 
other forms of fairness, but they have considerable discretion to behave with more versus less 
interpersonal fairness (Zapata, Carton, & Liu, 2016).   
The prediction that supervisors’ sense of power is likely to moderate the relationship 
between managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ interpersonal fairness in particular 
is theoretically grounded in the work of Mischel (1973) and Judge and Zapata (2015), who 
showed that the extent to which factors residing within persons influence their work 
behaviors depends on situational strength. Strong situations are those in which people receive 
clear cues on how to behave, thereby minimizing the influence of factors residing within 
persons (such as their sense of power). Weak situations are more ambiguous, thereby 
allowing for person variables to influence beliefs and behaviors. Importantly, Mischel (1973) 
posited that a major determinant of situational strength is how much discretion the situation 
allows people to have in how to respond; strong situations allow for little discretion whereas 
weak situations afford greater discretion.  
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Given the greater discretion associated with interpersonal fairness relative to the other forms 
of fairness, it stands to reason that theoretically relevant factors residing within persons (such 
as their sense of power) are more likely to influence their enactment of interpersonal 
fairness.1 If those with a weaker sense of power are more responsive to external cues for 
appropriate behavior (e.g., how others have behaved), then the moderating effect of sense of 
power on the relationship between managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ fairness 
behavior should be most likely to emerge on the form of supervisor fairness allowing for the 
greatest discretion, i.e., interpersonal fairness. In other words, we expect the trickle-down 
effect of managers’ informational fairness on supervisors’ interpersonal fairness will be more 
likely to emerge among supervisors with a lower sense of power. 
In summary, the above reasoning leads to the central hypothesis of the present studies:  
            Managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ sense of power will interact to 
influence supervisors’ enactment of interpersonal fairness to their direct reports. Specifically, 
the tendency for supervisors to show more interpersonal fairness towards their direct reports 
when they received greater informational fairness from their managers will be stronger 
among supervisors with a lower sense of power. 
 
Having set forth our primary hypothesis, we are not suggesting that the moderating 
effect of supervisors’ sense of power only applies to the relationship between managers’ 
informational fairness and supervisors’ interpersonal fairness. Put differently, it is possible for 
supervisors’ sense of power to moderate the influence of other forms of managerial fairness 
(such as their interpersonal fairness) on supervisors’ interpersonal fairness. Indeed, we test this 
hypothesis in a subsidiary analysis in Study 1.  
Plan of Study  
 
          We conducted two studies. Study 1 consisted of a cross-sectional field study in which 
we measured supervisors’ enactment of distributive, procedural, and informational fairness in 
addition to our focal dependent variable: supervisors’ interpersonal fairness. Given prior 
theory and research on managerial trickle-down effects in the realm of fairness, we expect 
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that managers’ informational fairness will be positively related to supervisors’ enactment of 
all dimensions of fairness (distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal) 
However, we posit that the person variable (supervisors’ sense of power) is less likely to 
interact with the managers’ informational fairness to influence supervisors’ expression of 
distributive, procedural, and informational fairness because of the lesser discretion associated 
with these other dimensions of fairness relative to interpersonal fairness.    
            Study 1 consisted of a multisource survey in which employees and their supervisors 
from a wide variety of organizations participated. Supervisors completed a measure of their 
sense of power and rated their managers’ informational fairness when making decisions. 
Independently, subordinates rated their supervisors on supervisors’ enactment of 
interpersonal fairness, along with the extent to which they exhibited distributive, procedural, 
and informational fairness. Whereas Study 1 examined the enactment of interpersonal 
fairness in actual organizational settings, the cross-sectional nature of Study 1 made it 
difficult to draw causal inferences. We redressed this shortcoming in Study 2 which consisted 
of an experiment in which the independent variables of managers’ informational fairness and 
supervisors’ sense of power were manipulated. If converging results emerge across different 
research designs with varying strengths and weaknesses, we gain confidence in the construct 
validity of the findings (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; De Cremer, van Dijke, Schminke, De 
Schutter, & Stouten 2018).  
 Study 1 
Methods 
     Sample and Procedure. We recruited participants through Flycatcher, a professionally 
managed research panel founded by Maastricht University. Flycatcher meets the ISO 26362 
requirements, a quality label certifying that this panel can be used for social science research. 
The panel consists of 16,000 Dutch citizens who participate in a maximum of eight surveys a 
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year. In return for their voluntary participation, panel members receive points that they can 
exchange for gift vouchers. Flycatcher first contacted participants who had administrative 
positions at their current organizations (“supervisors”) and asked them to complete an online 
survey and identify one of their subordinates by entering the subordinate’s email address. A 
message containing a link to another survey was then automatically sent to subordinates. We 
used a unique identification code to match the responses of supervisors and subordinates, 
which also ensured anonymity. We took several steps to ensure that the correct sources 
completed the surveys. For example, we emphasized throughout the process that integrity is 
crucial in the scientific process of survey research and stressed that it was necessary that 
supervisors and their matched subordinates completed the correct survey. In addition, the use 
of IP addresses and time stamps allowed us to verify that surveys were submitted from 
different IP addresses and at different times.  
            We asked Flycatcher to gather approximately 100 unique supervisor-subordinate 
dyads.2 To collect this number of dyads, Flycatcher first contacted 853 supervisors. In total, 
Flycatcher provided us with 102 unique complete dyads. Supervisors were on average 43.73 
years old (SD = 10.42); 68.6% were male and 31.4% female. They had an average 
organizational tenure of 11.67 years (SD = 7.35), job tenure of 8.29 years (SD = 6.09) and 
worked on average of 36.55 hours (SD = 7.36) per week. Subordinates of the supervisors 
were on average 40.93 years old (SD = 11.82); 59.8% were male and 40.2% female. On 
average, they had worked for 10.26 years (SD = 8.47) in their current organization, 8.43 years 
(SD = 7.87) in their current position and worked an average of 34.35 hours (SD = 8.91) per 
week.  
            Measures. All measures pertaining to the primary purpose of the study are reported 
below. Supervisors rated their sense of power and the informational fairness shown to them 
by their managers, in that order. Subordinates of supervisors indicated the extent to which 
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their supervisor enacted procedural, distributive, interpersonal, and informational fairness, in 
that order. The measures of sense of power and informational fairness were rated using a 
five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) and the remaining scales 
were rated using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).    
            We measured supervisors’ sense of power with the eight-item sense-of-power scale 
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Anderson et al., 2012), tailored to the context of their 
organization (van Dijke, De Cremer, Langendijk, & Anderson, 2018; e.g., “In this 
organization, I can get people to listen to what I say”).   
            As recommended by Bobocel and Zdaniuk (2005) we measured supervisors’ 
perceptions of their managers’ informational fairness along the dimensions of sincerity, 
adequacy, and legitimacy. We measured sincerity and adequacy with two-item scales, both 
taken from Bies, Shapiro, and Cummings (1988). Sample items include, “My boss is sincere 
when he/she gives reasons for his/her decisions,” and “The reasons that my boss gives for 
his/her decisions are adequate,” respectively. We measured legitimacy with two items taken 
from Rousseau and Tijoriwala (1999). A sample item was, “The reasons that my boss gives 
for his/her decisions are appropriate.” We combined the three measures into a six-item scale.    
            We measured subordinates’ perceptions of their supervisor’s interpersonal fairness 
enactment with the four-item scale developed by Colquitt (2001). A sample item included, 
“My supervisor treats me in a polite manner.” Finally, we also measured subordinates’ 
perceptions of their supervisor’s enactment of the other forms of fairness. Distributive 
fairness was measured with the four-item scale developed by Colquitt (2001). A sample item 
included, “My supervisor takes the effort I have put into my work into account when he 
makes decisions.” Procedural fairness was measured with the seven-item scale developed by 
Colquitt (2001). A sample item included, “My supervisor applies procedures consistently.” 
Informational fairness was measured with the five-item scale developed by Colquitt (2001). 
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A sample item included, “My supervisor explains procedures thoroughly.” 
Results and Discussion 
            Summary statistics appear in Table 1. 
            Interpersonal fairness ratings were strongly skewed. Given this fact, it is likely that 
some of the assumptions of OLS regressions were violated which can reduce power and 
inflate error variances (Wilcox & Keselman, 2004). To correct for this, we tested our 
hypotheses using robust ordinary least squares (White, 1980). We entered the main effects of 
supervisors’ perceptions of their managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ sense of 
power in step 1. We entered the interaction between informational fairness and supervisors’ 
sense of power in step 2. We mean-centered predictors and calculated the interactions based 
on these scores. Table 2 shows the results on the measure of interpersonal fairness. Whereas 
both main effects were positive and significant, of greater importance they were qualified by 
a significant interaction effect, p = .017 (see Table 2 and Figure 1).  
            To specify further the nature of the interaction effect we conducted simple slopes 
analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). As predicted, managers’ informational fairness was 
positively related to supervisors’ interpersonal fairness among supervisors with a lower sense 
of power (1 SD below the mean; b = 0.67, SE = 0.22, p = .002). In contrast, there was no 
relationship between managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ interpersonal fairness 
among supervisors with a higher sense of power (1 SD above the mean; b = 0.12, SE = 0.11, 
p = .250).  
            Furthermore, Tables 1 and 2 showed that as predicted, managers’ informational 
fairness was positively related to supervisors’ informational, procedural and distributive 
fairness.  However, in contrast to interpersonal fairness, none of these main effects was 
qualified by a significant interaction between managers’ informational fairness and 
supervisors’ sense of power.  
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Subsidiary Analyses 
           During the review process, it was called to our attention that other measures completed 
by supervisors about their managers’ fairness included an aspect of interpersonal fairness. 
More specifically, supervisors rated their managers’ tendencies to apologize (Howell, Dopko, 
Turowski, & Buro, 2011) which is one way in which managers express respectful, dignified, 
and polite behavior, all hallmarks of interpersonal fairness (Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993). 
Sample measures from this eight-item scale include, “To avoid feeling incompetent, my 
supervisor tends not to apologize” (reverse scored), and “My supervisor doesn’t apologize 
very often because he/she doesn’t like to admit that he/she is wrong” (reverse scored). 
Endpoints on the 7-point rating scale were “strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (7). 
Cronbach’s alpha was .94.  
           Accordingly, we repeated the hierarchical regression analysis previously reported 
which examined the interactive effect of managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ 
sense of power on supervisors’ interpersonal fairness, with managers’ tendencies to apologize 
substituted for informational fairness. Thus, in Step 1 we entered the main effects of 
managers’ tendencies to apologize and supervisors’ sense of power and in Step 2 we added 
the interaction between managers’ tendencies to apologize and supervisors’ sense of power. 
We mean-centered predictors and calculated the interactions based on these scores.  Of 
greatest importance, the interaction effect was significant, b = -0.26, SE = 0.12, p = .026. 
Simple slope analyses showed that managers’ willingness to apologize was positively related 
to supervisors’ interpersonal fairness among supervisors with a lower sense of power (1 SD 
below the mean; b = 0.41, SE = 0.18, p = .025). In contrast, there was no relationship between 
managers’ willingness to apologize and supervisors’ interpersonal fairness among supervisors 
with a higher sense of power (1 SD above the mean; b = .017, SE = .07, p = .797). These 
findings lend empirical support to our speculation that supervisors’ sense of power may not 
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only moderate the influence of their managers’ informational fairness but also the influence 
of other forms of their managers’ fairness on supervisors’ interpersonal fairness.  
          Moreover, just as we found for managers’ informational fairness, there was only a 
positive main effect of managers’ tendencies to apologize on supervisors’ enactment of other 
forms of fairness (that is, procedural, distributive, and informational). Supervisors’ sense of 
power did not moderate the positive relationships between managers’ tendencies to apologize 
and supervisors’ procedural (b = -0.18, SE = 0.11, p = .119), distributive (b = -0.11, SE = 
0.12, p = .349), and informational fairness (b = -0.09, SE = 0.11, p = .375).      
            The results of Study 1 were consistent with the notion that supervisors’ sense of 
power moderates the relationship between managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ 
interpersonal fairness in a linear fashion. However, this does not necessarily preclude the 
possibility that the moderating influence of sense of power may take a non-linear form. For 
instance, it could be that those relatively low and medium in sense of power both showed a 
stronger trickle-down effect that did not differ from one another, with both differing from a  
weaker trickle-down effect shown by those higher in sense of power. Another possibility is 
that those low in sense of power showed a stronger trickle-down effect than those with a 
medium or high sense of power, with the magnitude of the trickle-down effect for the latter 
two groups not differing from one another.  
To evaluate these and other possible non-linear moderating effects of sense of power, 
we conducted separate regression analyses in which we examined the interaction between 
managers’ informational fairness and: (1) the squared term of supervisors’ sense of power, 
and (2) the cubed term of supervisors’ sense of power. In fact, the interaction effect involving 
the squared and the cubed term of supervisors’ sense of power was not significant, b = 0.09, 
SE = 0.28, p = .748, and b = 0.48, SE = 0.48, p = .312, respectively.  
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The presence of these non-linear moderating effects of sense of power either: (1) 
reduced the significance of the focal interaction between managers’ informational fairness 
and supervisors’ sense of power to some degree (the focal interaction became marginally 
significant (p = .078) when the interaction between managers’ informational fairness and the 
squared term of supervisors’ sense of power was included in the regression analysis, or (2) 
had no effect on the focal interaction (the focal interaction remained significant (p = .018) 
when we controlled for the interaction between managers informational fairness and the 
cubed term of supervisors’ sense of power. Taken together, the results of these tests for non-
linearity lead us to conclude, albeit tentatively, that supervisors’ sense of power moderated 
the relationship between managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ interpersonal 
fairness primarily in a linear manner.  
One source of ambiguity in Study 1 emanates from the fact that we used two different 
measures of informational fairness. Supervisors rated the extent to which their managers’ 
explanations captured the relevant attributes of sincerity, adequacy, and legitimacy (Bobocel 
& Zdaniuk, 2005), whereas the subordinates of supervisors completed the Colquitt (2001) 
scale which assessed their perceptions of the quality of their supervisors’ explanations (e.g., 
thoroughness) and their communications more broadly (e.g., timeliness). The fact that two 
different measures were used suggests that the significant relationship between them (i.e., the 
trickle-down main effect of managers’ informational fairness on supervisors’ informational 
fairness) reflects the underlying construct rather than the way in which it was operationalized. 
It is also possible that the trickle-down main effect would have been even stronger had we 
used the same measure of informational fairness.        
   Study 2 
            Study 1 lent support to the hypothesis that the trickle-down effect of managers’ 
informational fairness on supervisors’ interpersonal fairness was more likely to emerge 
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among supervisors with a lower sense of power. Although Study 1 used a setting that 
provides data of high ecological validity, its cross-sectional design does not allow us to draw 
causal inferences. Therefore, an important purpose of Study 2 was to test for the interactive 
relationship between managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ sense of power using 
an experimental design. In Study 2 we introduced participants to the context of a simulated 
company and placed them in a supervisory position, in which they had a boss above them as 
well as direct reports below them. We manipulated the participants’ sense of power and their 
manager’s informational fairness. Given that the findings of Study 1 showed that the 
predicted interaction effect only emerged on the measure of interpersonal fairness enactment, 
the dependent variable of Study 2 consisted of participants’ motivation to enact interpersonal 
fairness towards their subordinates.  
Methods 
     Sample and Procedure. We recruited 319 employed adult participants from the United 
States (US) using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT is an online platform that allows 
researchers to collect reliable data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Kilduff, Galinksy, 
Gallo, & Reade, 2016). Based on the criteria explained below (see Procedure), we excluded 
52 participants from our analyses. This resulted in a final sample of 267 working adults. They 
were 50.60% male, 37.06 years old on average (SD = 10.69), worked 42.05 hours a week on 
average (SD = 7.30), and had on average 16.83 years of work experience (SD = 10.23). We 
assigned the participants randomly to one of four conditions in a 2 (sense of power: high vs. 
low) × 2 (managerial informational fairness: high vs. low) between-subjects design.  
            All manipulations and measures pertaining to the main purpose of the study are 
described below. We invited the AMT panelists to take part in an online study. Once they 
logged in to the study website, they were led to believe that they would be participating in a 
group task together with four other participants. We employed the well-validated in-basket 
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task approach because this type of managerial role-playing exercise provides realism and 
external validity in studying organizational behavior while maintaining the advantages of 
doing research in a relatively controlled environment (Treviño, 1992; Zedeck, 1986). 
Specifically, based on a methodology used previously we told participants that they would be 
working in a simulated company that was hierarchically structured in three organizational 
layers; a visual illustration of the hierarchy was provided on a computer screen placed in 
front of them (De Cremer, et al., 2018; van Dijke et al., 2018). Instructions indicated that one 
group member would be placed at the top-management position, two members in the middle-
management position, and two other members in the employee position. Subsequently, we 
indicated that a network connection would be established between them and the other team 
members.  
            All participants were assigned on a seemingly random basis to the middle-
management level position. They were then informed that their boss would contact them soon 
with further instructions regarding the tasks they would have to complete. While waiting for 
the instructions of the boss to arrive, we asked them if they could help with a supposedly 
unrelated task in which they were given five minutes to describe a situation in which they had 
high (vs. low) power over other individuals. This task served as the manipulation of sense of 
power, which was taken from Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003). The participants in the 
high-sense-of-power condition read: 
Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or 
individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of 
another person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to 
evaluate those individuals. Please describe this situation in which you had power— 
what happened, how you felt, etc. 
 
The participants in the low-sense-of-power condition read:  
Please recall a particular incident in which someone else had power over you. By 
power, we mean a situation in which someone had control over your ability to get 
something you wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. Please describe this 
situation in which you did not have power—what happened, how you felt, etc. 
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            Two independent coders rated the sense of power that the participants conveyed in the 
recalled episodes using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all to 5 = very much). Interrater 
agreement between the two coders was high, r = .81, p < .001, hence, we used the average 
ratings of the two coders as a manipulation check on sense of power.  
           Next, participants received an email with instructions from their manager at the top 
level. In reality, this information was preprogrammed and constituted the manipulation of 
managerial informational fairness. We operationalized this manipulation by including 
information about the adequacy, legitimacy, and sincerity of the explanation (see Bobocel & 
Zdaniuk, 2005). Thus, the explanation delivered to the participants varied along these three 
dimensions to produce a high informational fairness condition and a low informational 
fairness condition. In the high informational fairness condition, participants received the 
following message: 
“To make you feel comfortable, I want to provide sufficient and adequate task 
information. Your scores will be compared, in the best and most accurate way 
possible, with those of the others. High scores can bring an extra financial bonus. The 
order of the tasks will be that we first start with business problems at the local level, 
then at the continental level, and finally at the global level. Why? Well, I believe that 
addressing first those business problems that are more familiar will build a 
framework that will allow you to do your tasks more efficiently. Also, be assured that 
you can ask questions at any point. I realize that these types of tasks can be very 
stressful because of their competitive nature.”  
 
In the low informational fairness condition (n = 139), participants received this message:  
“Without explaining this procedure in any detail, you should only know that I will 
compare your performance with the performance of the other employees. You may 
have a chance to win an extra financial bonus. I have decided that the order of the 
tasks will be that you first start with business problems at the local level, then at the 
continental level, and finally at the global level. I am sure no explanation is needed to 
understand why this is the case. Also, do not ask me too many questions.   
             
            As a check on the informational fairness manipulation, participants rated the extent to 
which they agreed with three questions (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), e.g., “My 
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supervisor has given me sufficient and adequate explanation about what I need to do”, “The 
explanation provided by my supervisor was appropriate and acceptable”, and “My supervisor 
comes across as sincere and caring in how he explains things” (Cronbach’s α = .93).  
We then measured the dependent measure, interpersonal fairness. Participants read 
that shortly they would be asked to contact one of their employees. They were then asked to 
indicate how they will approach the employee. We used Colquitt’s (2001) four-item 
interpersonal fairness scale used in Study 1 (1 = not at all, 7 = very much); e.g., “How much 
effort will you put in making sure that you treat your employee with respect” (Cronbach’s α = 
.95).  
After completing the interpersonal fairness measure, participants were told that the 
experiment was over, due to an error in the established connection between the organizational 
members. Participants read that they were going to be redirected to the end of the study in 
which we introduced attention checks and measured demographics. At the end of the 
experiment, participants were given an open-ended opportunity to write any remarks they 
might have.  
           Participant exclusion. We asked participants to indicate their position in the 
organizational hierarchy in the experiment (top management, middle management, or 
employee). We removed twelve participants who did not correctly indicate their assigned 
position. At the end of the experiment, we included an additional attention check, in which 
participants were required to choose the fifth response option to the question, “Who is your 
favorite classical music composer?” (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). A total of 
29 participants failed this attention check and were excluded from our analyses. Finally, we 
removed from analyses eleven participants who failed to describe the high/low power condition 
requested of them. A Pearson Chi-squared test of a 4 (conditions) by 2 (selected or not) cross-
tabulation revealed that the percentage of excluded participants did not differ among the four 
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
 
experimental conditions (χ2 = 1.73, df = 3, p = .630).  
Results  
            Manipulation checks. A two-way ANOVA revealed that participants in the high-
sense-of-power condition experienced a higher sense of power than participants in the low-
sense-of-power condition (Ms = 4.32 vs. 1.54, SDs =.56 vs. .68, respectively), F(1, 263) = 
1304.57, p < .001, η2 = .83. Neither the main effect of managerial informational fairness (F(1, 
263) = 0.06, p = .803, η2 = .00) nor the interaction effect was significant, (F(1, 263) = 0.33, p 
= .568, η2 = .00).  
Further, a two-way ANOVA on the informational fairness scale yielded only a 
significant main effect of informational fairness, F(1, 263) = 117.59, p < .001, η2 = .31. 
Explanations were rated as more adequate, acceptable, and sincere in the high informational 
fairness condition than in the low informational fairness condition (Ms = 5.05 vs. 3.15, SDs = 
1.31 vs. 1.53, respectively). Neither the main effect of power (F(1, 263) = 0.01, p = .910, η2 = 
.00) nor the interaction effect was significant, (F(1, 263) = 0.34, p = .559, η2 = .00). In sum, 
both experimental manipulations were successfully induced.  
            Hypothesis testing. A two-way ANOVA on participants’ motivation to enact 
interpersonal fairness showed a main effect of informational fairness, F(1, 263) = 7.76, p = 
.006, η2 = .03. Participants were more willing to enact interpersonal fairness in the high 
informational fairness condition than in the low informational fairness condition (Ms = 6.44 
vs. 6.09, SDs = .86 vs. 1.23, respectively). The main effect of power was not significant, F(1, 
263) = 3.2, p = .070, η2 = .01. Of greater importance, the interaction effect was significant, 
F(1, 263) = 4.31, p = .039, η2 = .02; see Figure 2. Simple effects showed that among 
participants with a lower sense of power, high informational fairness led to greater motivation 
to enact interpersonal fairness (M = 6.45, SD = 0.87) than low informational fairness (M = 
5.82, SD = 1.33; F(1, 263) = 11.92, p < .001). Among participants with a higher sense of 
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power, high informational fairness did not lead to greater motivation to enact interpersonal 
fairness (M = 6.42, SD = .86) compared to low informational fairness (M = 6.33, SD = 1.09; 
F(1, 263) = 0.12, p = .739). 
Discussion 
            With a more internally valid research design than that used in Study 1, Study 2 
provided converging support for the previous findings. Nonetheless, Study 2 had some 
limitations. Whereas the results of Study 2 showed that the positive relationship between 
managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ interpersonal fairness was significantly 
stronger among those lower than higher in sense of power, in the absence of a control group, 
we cannot tell if the significant difference in Study 2 between the higher and lower power 
conditions is due to the higher power group, to the lower power group, or to a combination of 
the two. It also is worth noting that the mean level of interpersonal fairness across conditions 
was high in Study 2 (as it was in Study 1). However, this is not uncommon, having been 
found in prior research (e.g., Matta, Scott, Guo, & Matusik, 2019; Wo, et al., 2015; Zapata et 
al., 2016). Nevertheless, it is an open question whether the interactive relationship between 
managers’ informational fairness and supervisors’ sense of power found in both studies 
would generalize to contexts in which the overall level of supervisors’ interpersonal fairness 
is lower.   
            It also may have been the case that the manipulation of managerial informational 
fairness included other dimensions of fairness. For instance, part of the message in the high 
informational fairness condition was, “be assured that you can ask questions at any point. I 
realize that these types of tasks can be very stressful because of their competitive nature” 
whereas the corresponding part of the message in the low informational fairness condition 
was, “I am sure no explanation is needed to understand why this is the case. Also, do not ask 
me too many questions.” This may have led participants also to experience greater 
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interpersonal fairness in the high informational fairness versus the low informational fairness 
condition, a possibility that cannot be entirely discounted.  
            However, even if the informational manipulation introduced other elements of 
fairness such as interpersonal fairness, we would still expect to find a moderating effect of 
sense of power on the trickle-down effect of managers’ interpersonal fairness on supervisors’ 
interpersonal fairness. This is because of the nature of the dependent variable: interpersonal 
fairness, which allows for greater personal discretion than other forms of fairness. Since 
interpersonal fairness allows for relatively high personal discretion, we would expect the 
person variable (supervisors’ sense of power) to moderate the relationship between 
managers’ interpersonal fairness and supervisors’ enactment of interpersonal fairness. Indeed, 
the results of a subsidiary analysis in Study 1 lent support to this reasoning.     
            Finally, the recall prime that we used to manipulate sense of power has been criticized 
for possibly introducing demand characteristics, especially when it is accompanied by a 
manipulation check measure that is completed by participants themselves (Sturm & 
Antonakis, 2015). To reduce the possible impact of demand characteristics, we presented the 
recall task as unrelated to the main study; it was something participants were asked to do 
while allegedly waiting to complete the main task. Furthermore, instead of including 
manipulation check items asking participants how powerful they felt, we had their 
recollections judged by trained raters. On a related note, Rinderknecht (2019) recently 
expressed concern about the viability of using a power-based recall priming manipulation 
when collecting data on AMT as we did in Study 2. Rinderknecht found that the priming 
manipulation of power employed in Study 2 may be less effective than other manipulations of 
power in the AMT context, such as assigning participants to play roles varying in degree of 
power (e.g., boss versus subordinate). This suggests that, if anything, the moderating effect of 
supervisors’ sense of power might have been even stronger in Study 2 if we had we used the 
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alternative way of manipulating sense of power employed by Rinderknecht.        
General Discussion 
            The present findings make multiple contributions to the “fifth wave” of justice 
research which includes delineating when and why supervisors behave more versus less fairly 
to their direct reports (e.g., Brockner et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2009). In particular, we join 
recent work in the area of justice trickle-down effects (e.g., Wo et al., 2015), extending this 
literature empirically and conceptually. Empirically, we delineate when justice trickle-down 
effects are more versus less likely to occur. The results of both studies showed that 
supervisors with a lower sense of felt power were more likely to treat their direct reports in a 
manner consistent with how they were treated by their managers (that is, managers’ 
informational fairness trickled down to influence supervisors’ interpersonal fairness), relative 
to supervisors who experienced a higher sense of power.   
            Conceptually, we help to understand when and why people may be more versus less 
likely to show a justice trickle-down effect. A question of fundamental importance in social 
and personality psychology is when are people more likely to guide their behavior on the 
basis of internal versus external sources of information (i.e., the person-situation debate). One 
determinant of the influence on behavior of internal versus external cues is the strength of the 
situation (Judge & Zapata, 2015; Mischel, 1973). Strong situations influence people’s 
behavior without allowing person variables to have much of an effect. In contrast, weak 
situations, such as those that give people discretion in how to behave allow for the influence 
of theoretically-relevant person variables, in this instance, their sense of power.  
          Grounding the present findings in Mischel’s (1973) notion of situational strength may 
help to delineate when and why other variables residing within persons may influence the 
magnitude of justice trickle-down effects. One element of situational strength is the extent to 
which it gives people discretion in how to respond which is more the case for interpersonal 
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fairness than for the other dimensions of fairness (Scott et al., 2009). However, other inputs 
into situational strength may dictate when justice trickle-down effects are likely to be 
influenced by person variables residing within supervisors. For example, imagine two 
supervisors (A and B), each of whom reports to two different bosses, a common occurrence 
in matrix organizations. In Supervisor A’s case, both bosses exhibit the same level of 
informational fairness (their boss’ behavior is consistent with each other, which sends a clear 
message to Supervisor A as to how s/he should behave). In Supervisor B’s case, the bosses 
are inconsistent: one exhibits high informational fairness whereas the other exhibits low 
informational fairness. Given that the situation faced by Supervisor B is weak (relative to the 
one faced by Supervisor A), it may be expected that person variables residing within 
Supervisor B are more likely to influence how fairly she behaves towards her direct reports 
than would be the case for Supervisor A. For instance, Supervisor B’s level of moral identity 
(a known predictor of people’s tendencies to behave fairly; Brebels et al., 2011) may be more 
positively related to her tendency to behave fairly towards her direct reports than would be 
the case for Supervisor A.  
            The present studies also contribute to theory and research on how the various forms of 
managerial fairness meaningfully differ from one another. Scott et al. (2009) suggested and 
research has shown (Scott et al., 2014) that interpersonal fairness allows managers to exert 
greater discretion in its enactment relative to other forms of managerial fairness (distributive, 
procedural, and informational), which are more organizationally controlled. The present 
research demonstrated a noteworthy consequence of the difference in discretion associated 
with the various forms of fairness: a person variable (supervisors’ sense of power) was more 
likely to moderate a justice trickle-down effect that allowed for greater discretion 
(supervisors’ expression of interpersonal fairness).   
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            Furthermore, this is one of the few studies to show that managers’ sense of power 
may be linked to their enactment of interpersonal fairness (see also Blader & Chen, 2012, 
Study 3). At first blush the present findings seem inconsistent with those of Blader and Chen 
who found that sense of power caused people to behave with lower fairness. (Blader and 
Chen also found that the sense of high status led to the enactment of higher levels of 
fairness.) We found that those with a higher sense of power either showed higher levels of 
interpersonal fairness (in Study 1) or equal levels of interpersonal fairness (in Study 2), 
relative to their counterparts who experienced less power.    
           There are some noteworthy differences between the present studies and those of 
Blader and Chen (2012), however, which may help to reconcile the seemingly disparate 
effects of sense of power. In their Studies 1-3 Blader and Chen induced participants to 
experience either high power or high status, relative to a control condition. However, no 
other factors were varied. Thus, the potential for lower power people to vary their behavior as 
a function of external cues was not present in the context of Blader and Chen’s Studies 1-3.    
            In contrast, Studies 4 and 5 in Blader and Chen (2012) were conducted in a way that 
allowed the greater sensitivity of lower power people to external cues to emerge. More 
specifically, in these two studies the authors orthogonally manipulated power and status. In 
their Studies 1-3, those led to experience high status behaved with higher levels of fairness. 
In their Studies 4 and 5, the positive relationship between felt status and enacted fairness was 
moderated by power, in which the tendency for higher status to lead to greater fairness was 
stronger among those who experienced lower power. At a higher level of abstraction, then, 
the present results are consistent with the findings of Blader and Chen in the following sense: 
when felt power is varied along with other factors known to influence the enactment of 
fairness (informational fairness from higher level management in the present studies and 
status in Studies 4 and 5 in Blader and Chen), the fairness behavior of those lower in power is 
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more likely to be influenced by those other cues. 
Limitations 
            The present studies are limited in several respects. For instance, neither study 
measured supervisors’ actual enactment of interpersonal fairness. The dependent variable in 
Study 1 consisted of subordinates’ perceptions of their supervisors’ interpersonal fairness 
whereas in Study 2 the dependent measure assessed behavioral intentions rather than 
behavior.  
            The present studies also did not fully specify the mechanism through which lower 
power people showed more of the trickle-down effect observed in the present studies. The 
results on the manipulation check of informational fairness in Study 2 showed that those 
higher and lower in power perceived the manipulation to an equivalent degree. Given that 
higher and lower power participants perceived the informational fairness manipulation to the 
same degree, it must have been that higher and lower power individuals responded differently 
to their (equivalent) fairness perceptions. The basis of such differing reactions, however, was 
not revealed by the present studies. For example, one possibility is that those higher in power 
were more confident than their counterparts lower in power about their own beliefs about 
how to respond, thereby making the higher sense of power supervisors less likely to take their 
cues from their managers’ fairness behavior.  
            Finally, whereas a central premise of the present studies is that interpersonal fairness 
allows for more personal discretion than other dimensions of fairness, we did not directly 
evaluate the likelihood that those with more of a sense of power also experienced greater  
discretion than their counterparts with less of a sense of power. This possibility is implicit in 
our reasoning that supervisors with more of a sense of power are less likely to guide their 
behavior on the basis of external cues (such as their managers’ fairness) and are instead more 
likely to act on the basis of factors internal to themselves such as their traits, values, and 
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preferences. Whereas the present studies showed that those with more of a sense of power 
were less influenced by their managers’ fairness, they do not show what did influence them.  
            One possibility is that other factors residing within persons that influence supervisors’ 
expression of fairness would have more of an effect on the interpersonal fairness shown by 
supervisors with more of a sense of power. For instance, Brebels et al. (2011) found that 
those higher in moral identity adhered more to principles of procedural fairness. Let us 
assume that moral identity also is positively related to the expression of interpersonal 
fairness. If so, it may be that the positive relationship between supervisors’ moral identity and 
their interpersonal fairness behavior will be stronger among those with more of a sense of 
power, who are more apt to guide their behavior on the basis of factors residing within 
themselves.                  
            This speculation is consistent with a guiding principle of the present studies, namely, 
that greater discretion makes person variables more predictive of behavior. The source of the 
discretion may reside in the situation (i.e., interpersonal fairness allows for greater discretion 
than do the other forms of fairness) and it also may reside in the person (those with more of a 
sense of power experience greater discretion than do those with less of a sense of power). 
However, given that the design of the present studies did not include other theoretically-
relevant person variables (besides sense of power), we were unable to evaluate whether such 
factors would have more of an influence on the interpersonal fairness shown by those with 
more of a sense of power. This speculation does, however, provide an opportunity for future 
research.  
Practical Implications    
            Numerous studies have shown that the interpersonal fairness with which employees 
are treated by their supervisors affects a wide array of work attitudes and behaviors (e.g., 
Margolis & Molinsky, 2008; Molinsky & Margolis, 2005; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; 
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
 
Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004). Hence, the present studies provide insight into the 
practically important questions of when and why supervisors exhibit interpersonal fairness 
towards their subordinates. The main effect of informational fairness received from higher 
levels of management found in both studies is yet another reminder that the extent to which 
supervisors “on the ground” behave with high interpersonal fairness starts at the top. In fact, 
the present findings illustrate a cross-over main effect in that managers’ informational 
fairness influenced supervisors’ enactment of interpersonal fairness.  
            Furthermore, the moderating effect of sense of power on the trickle-down effect of 
managers’ informational fairness on supervisors’ interpersonal fairness found in both studies 
(and the conceptually analogous interaction effect between managers’ tendencies to apologize 
and supervisors’ sense of power in the subsidiary analysis in Study 1)  identify when those at 
the top need to be particularly mindful to behave with high degrees of fairness. Whenever 
employees are likely to be experiencing a reduced sense of power, such as during times of 
organizational transition or when employees have recently joined the organization, they may 
be particularly likely to guide their behavior on the basis of external cues. This is precisely 
when those at higher levels of management need to serve as positive role models by 
exhibiting high levels of fairness.  
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Footnotes 
 
1. In depicting sense of power as a factor residing within people, we are not necessarily 
conceptualizing it to be a relatively stable individual difference variable. It can be, but it also 
can be a psychological state (Anderson et al., 2012). 
 
2. There were no established effects on which to base our sample size. Therefore, in Study 1 
we collected data from the number of respondents similar to what was done in other 
multisource studies in the justice literature (e.g., Zheng, Yuan, van Dijke, De Cremer, & Van 
Hiel, 2018; van Gils, Van Quaquebeke, van Knippenberg, van Dijke, &  De Cremer, 2015). 
For Study 2, we followed Simmons, Nelson and Simonsohn’s (2013) recommendation of 
using at least 50 participants in every cell.  
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Table 1 
Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Cronbach’s Alpha’s 
         
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Supervisor rated variables         
1. Managers’ Inform. Fairness  3.82 0.75 (.93)      
2. Sense of power 3.65 0.74 .55*** (.86)     
Subordinate rated variables         
3. Interpersonal fairness  6.00 1.12 .46*** .51*** (.96)    
4. Informational fairness  5.72 1.06 .44*** .53*** .83*** (.94)   
5. Distributive fairness  5.60 1.04 .58*** .54*** .82*** .79*** (.96)  
6. Procedural fairness  5.66 1.06 .42*** .52*** .84*** .87*** .85*** (.95) 
Cronbach’s alphas are on the diagonal. The measures of manager’s informational fairness and 
sense of power were rated using a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly 
agree) and the remaining scales were rated using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 = strongly agree). 
* p < .05.  
** p < .01.  
*** p < .001.  
Two tailed tests.    
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Table 2 
Robust Regression Analysis: Interactive Effects of Managers’ Informational Fairness and Supervisors’ Sense of Power on Supervisors 
Enactment of Fairness  
(Study 1) 
Regression Table with the Sense of Power x Managers’ Informational Fairness interaction.  
Predictors were mean-centered; Unstandardized coefficients are reported; Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.; † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
  Criterion Variable 
Variables  Interpersonal fairness   Informational fairness   Distributive fairness   Procedural fairness 
Intercept  
6.00*** 
(0.09) 
6.11*** 
(0.10) 
  
5.72*** 
(0.09) 
5.70*** 
(0.11) 
  
5.60*** 
(0.08) 
5.64*** 
(0.09) 
   
5.66*** 
(0.09) 
5.69*** 
(0.10) 
 
                 
Managers’ Informational Fairness  
0.38*  
(0.13) 
0.40** 
(0.13) 
  0.30* 
(0.14) 
0.30* 
(0.15) 
  
0.56*** 
(0.13) 
0.56*** 
(0.12) 
  
0.27† 
(0.14) 
0.27† 
(0.14) 
 
                 
Sense of power  
0.56*** 
(0.15) 
0.68*** 
(0.14) 
  0.60*** 
(0.13) 
0.59*** 
(0.13) 
  
0.45*** 
(0.12) 
0.49*** 
(0.12) 
  
0.59*** 
(0.12) 
0.62*** 
(0.13) 
 
                 
Managers’ Informational Fairness × Sense of 
power 
  -0.37* 
(0.15) 
-   
0.05 
(0.14) 
   
-0.14 
(0.15) 
   
-0.10 
(0.14) 
 
                 
                 
                 
R2  0.31 0.34   .32 .32   .40 .41   0.29 0.30  
ΔR2   0.03*    .00    .01    0.01  
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Figure 1 
Study 1: Interaction between Managers’ Informational Fairness and Supervisors’ Sense of 
Power on Supervisors’ Interpersonal Fairness  
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Figure 2 
Study 2: Interaction between Managers’ Informational Fairness and Supervisors’ Sense of 
Power on Supervisors’ Motivation to Enact Interpersonal Fairness  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
